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Summary findings
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),  because some FDI in China has been of poor quality,
established in 1988, is part of the World Bank Group. Its  with little transfer of skills and technology. Some local
mandate is to promote foreign investment in its member  partners  have conceded too many discounts to foreign
countries by providing political risk insurance and  investors, without considering the cost of key assets such
technical assistance to promote  investment.  as land and machinery. Some foreign investors have
In developing this case study of China's evolving  taken advantage of local officials' eagerness for foreign
relationship with MIGA, Feng asked: Why did China  capital, pressuring them to grant guarantees they should
decide to seek membership in MIGA? What was the  not grant and to allow unacceptable levels of
outcome of the relationship between China and MIGA?  environmental pollution in industry.
How has that relationship affected economic and legal  China receives one-third of all FDI in developing
reform in China and the country's integration with the  countries. To continue attracting such investment, it
multilateral investment insurance system? How can  must design a rule-based legal system governing FDI,
MIGA strengthen its role? And how can MIGA prevent  making its rules and regulations more transparent,
potential claims to its portfolio in China?  uniform, and consistent with international practice. As a
MIGA's comparative advantages are its international  neutral third party, MIGA could make policy
experience in underwriting and operating its portfolio,  recommendations that authorities might consider and
its neutral position and approach,  its rnediation and legal  accept -such  as policies designed to encourage less
advice, and the fact that its guarantee portfolio  is  investment in labor-intensive firms and more in high-tech
unaffected by bilateral relations.  industries.
Feng suggests that in China, MIGA should screen
foreign direct investment (FDi), not just encourage it,
This paper-a  product of the Office of the Vice President and General Counsel, Legal Affairs and Claims, MIGA-  is  part
of a larger effort in the Bank Group to promote foreign investment in its member countries. The paper was produced while
the author was a visiting research fellow at the Bank. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street-NW,  Washington, DC 20433.Please contact Elisabeth Beers,  room U12-121, telephone 202-473-6175, fax 202-522-
2640, Internet address ebeers@woridbank.org. May 1997. (37 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is  to get the  findings  out quickly,  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterChina and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Yushu Feng*
*World Bank Visiting Research Fellow (1996-97), on leave from the Ministry of Finance, China.
I would like to thank Lorin Weisenfeld (Principal Counsel, MIGA), Gerald T. West (Senior
Advisor, MIGA Guarantees Department), Yong Li (Chinese Executive Director, IBRD and
MIGA), Yingming Yang (MIGA Desk, Chinese Executive Director's Office), Antonio Parra (Legal
Adviser, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes), Srilal Perera and Manfredi
Ottieri (Counsels, MIGA ), Daniel Wagner (Guarantees Officer, MIGA), Natalie G. Lichtenstein
(Chief Counsel, Legal Department, World Bank), and Margaret M. Pearson and Hongying Wang
(University of Maryland) for their comments on the draft of this paper.
I am grateful to Ibrahim Shihata (Senior Vice President and General Counsel, World Bank) for his
guidance and comments on this paper. My special thanks go to Akira lida (Executive Vice
President, MIGA), Luis Dodero (Vice President and General Counsel, MIGA), Xian Zhu and
Xiaojiang Pan (Deputy Director-Generals, World Bank Department, Ministry of Finance, China),
and Boris Pleskovic (Deputy Administrator, Research Advisory Staff, World Bank) for their
encouragement and guidance in this research.I  INTRODUCTION
The Multilateral  Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established in 1988, is
part of the World Bank Group. Its mandate is to promote and encourage  foreign investment
into its developing  member countries  by providing  political risk insurance and by providing
technical assistance for  investment promotion.' As  of January  1997 MIGA  has  141
members, of which 121 are developing countries. 2 Since its inception,  MIGA has issued
more than 225 guarantee contracts, which represent more than  $2.3 billion of contingent
liabilities  in about 40 developing  countries. 3
China returned  to  the  international economic community by  resuming  its
membership at the World  Bank Group and the International  Monetary  Fund (IMF) in 1980.4
In 1988, China  joined MIGA. China's participation  in  MIGA is owed to two factors. First,
China's successful inclusion in the  World Bank and IMF  provided China with valuable
experience in  participating  in and cooperating  with international  economic organizations.
IThe objective  of MIGA "shall be to encourage  the flow of investments  for productive  purposes among member  countries,
and in particular  to developing  member countries". Article  2, MIGA Convention, 1985.
Member countries are divided into  two category:  Category  I ( industrial  nations) and Category  II (developing  nations).
3 IMIGA  Annual Report, 1996,  and statistics from Guarantee  Department of MIGA.
4 This background is described and analyzed  in Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg. "China's Participation in the
IMF,  the World  Bank, and GA IT',  the University  of Michigan Press, 1990.
3Second, greater assurances for investors were deemed necessary to attract  foreign direct
investment  (FDI) as China's economic  reform progresses.
The next section of the paper analyses China's evolving  relationship  with MIGA
by emphasizing the process and significance  of China's integration into the international
investment insurance regime represented by MIGA,  and seeks to identify MIGA's role in
China's integration.  Section 3  examines MIGA's portfolio in China,  focusing on the  legal
issues regarding the guarantee coverage,  with a discussion  of prevention of potential claims.
Section 4  discusses MIGA's  challenges and presents recommendations in light of  a
member country's  perspective.  Section 5 provides some concluding  remarks.
HI  CHINA'SINTEGRATION
1.  China's recognition  of the multilateral investment insurance  system
China's  preparation to join  MIGA triggered a  domestic discussion involving
academics  and  government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance (MOF),  the
People's Bank of China  (PBC), the Bank of China (BOC), the People's Insurance Company
of China (PICC), the State Administration  of Foreign Exchange Control ( SAFEC ), the
China Council for Promotion  of International  Trade ( CCPIT ),  and the China International
Trade  and  Investment  Company (CMC).  Different  approaches towards  MIGA's
Convention  were discussed.
4First, with regard to disputes  submitted to international  arbitration, one approach
considered  that once MIGA is subrogated  to a claim, its rights could never be greater than
the rights of the original  investors. The question is, if there is a dispute between China and
MIGA  as subrogee to  an investor, the dispute might be  submitted to  an international
arbitration  agency  which might not have been available  to the investor to the same extent In
that case, it would be hard for China  to accept, because the current practice of China related
to the scope of acceptance of arbitration proceedings is limited only to the compensated
amount, which was also stipulated in many bilateral investment treaties China has signed
with other countries.
The advocates of this approach think that once MIGA functions as subrogee, the
nature of dispute would change from a dispute between an investor and a host country to
one  between an intemational organization (MIGA) and a host country (China). As two
entities under  intemational law,  such  disputes might  be  submitted to  intemational
arbitration,  according  to existing  international  practice.
Second, with regard to applicable  laws, one approach was that, to setde disputes
between an investor (or its subrogee) and a host country,  domestic laws of that host country
should  have priority.  However, MIGA's Convention  gave primacy to international  law, and
put a host country's domestic  law into a second  priority. This was not in conformity  with the
5principle that the settlement of investment  disputes should be first resolved through a host
country's domestic  law.
The advocates  of this approach  held that once  MIGA is subrogated  to a claim, the
nature of the dispute would change as discussed above; therefore, the applied laws relating
to the settlement of disputes between two intemational  legal entities should be determined
by the agreement of both entities, in accordance with the MIGA Convention and related
rules of international  law.
Analyzing  the foregoig  approaches,  the first one could be classified as "open and
practical", which is based on the nation's open door policy. This approach sought every
practical means to attract FDI in order to accelerate economic development. The second
could  be  classified as  "conservative and  traditional", which put  more  emphasis on
"sovereignly", and worried about possible loss of some aspects of  sovereignty as the
management  of disputes occurred between investors and the government.
According to  intemational law,  the regulation  of  foreign investments is
determined  by the host countries.  '  But by joining MIGA, the sovereignty  of a host country
could be limited to some extent  To decide whether to join MIGA,  the following legal
issues  were addressed in light of China's  recognitionFirst,  recognition that the MIGA
5 "Charter of Economic  Rights and Duties of States" (UNGA Resolution 3281 of 1974) acknowledged  each State's right to
regulate foreign investment.
6Convention  prevails over  domestic law. The relations  between international and domestic
law are stipulated  in China's Civil  Code. 6 That is to say, whern  there is a conflict  between an
intemational  treaty (M1GA  Convention)  and domestic Chinese law or regulation,  the treaty
(MIGA  Convention)  has  priority, unless China made reservations to some clauses of
MIGA  Convention while joining MIGA.  Since the MIGA  Convention has no  clause
allowing reservations,  and is a constituent  instrument of an international  organization, 7 once
China joined, China would probably have to  accept all the provisions of  the MIGA
Convention.  In addition,  the guarantee contract between MIGA and an investor would bind
indirectly to  some  extent  the host  country (China).  With the  system of  priority of
international  law, is it prudent  for China  to decide to join or not ?
Second, recognition  of subrogation  at multilateral level.  At the domestic level,
China  recognizes subrogation.S  At  the bilateral level, China signed the Investment
Incentive Agreement with United States in  1980,  relating to investment insurance and
investment guaranties  which  are  administered by  the  Overseas  Private  Investment
Corporation  (OPIC). China agreed that OPIC could  have subrogation  for the investments  in
6  If there is a conflict between civil laws of People's Republic of China (PRC) and international treaties contracted  or
joined  by the PRC,  international  treaties  will apply  with  exception  of reservations  made  by the PRC  while  contracting  or
joining. " Article 142, China Civil Code, 19 86.
7 According to the "Vienna Convention  on the Law of Treaties",  if there is no clause allowing reservations in a treaty, it does
not mean a State could not make a reservation.  However,  it is hard for a State to make a reservation to the MIGA
Convention,  because such a reservation  may be incompatible  with the object and purpose of MIGA Convention,  and
because such a reservation  would in any event  require the approval of the Council of Govemors  of MIGA. c.f. Article
19, and 20 of Vienna Convention  on the Law of Treaties,  Basic Documents  in Intenational Law, Clarendon  Press, 1983.
For example, China's  Economic  Contract Law stipulates  that: "where a third party is liable to compensate  for the loss of
the insured property, should  the insured demand  it of the insurer, the latter may advance  the compensation  according  to
the contract provisions.  But the insured must assign the right to claim to the insurer and assist the latter in claiming
compensation  from the third party." See: Article 25, Economic  Contract Law, 1993.
7China insured by  OPIC. 9 These legal practices laid  a  solid foundation for  China's
recognition  of subrogation  at the multilateral level.  This marks a progress toward further
integration  in an intemational  investment  insurance  regime.
Third, recognition  of intemational  arbitration  and its procedure. By joining MIGA,
disputes between MIGA (as subrogee) and China will be  settled through international
arbitration  instead of  the host country's courts, and the arbitration tribunal may not apply
only to the domestic regulations of the host country, but also the MIGA Convention  and
related intemational  regulations.
2.  Reasons for  China's decision to join
First, MIGA may  not  issue a political risk insurance contract without a  host
country's prior approval. This will provide  the Chinese  government  with a prior opportunity
to evaluate the nature of the investment  and its non-commercial  risk coverage and to decide
whether  to approve  it or not, according  to the nation's economic  development  priority.
Second, MIGA is an international  economic organization, in which China is not
only one of the key members, but also may have the opportunity  to elect a member of the
Board of Directors.  International organizations  should safeguard their member countries'
interests. Under its Convention,  MIGA is supposed to keep neutral  in terms of politics; it
9This  agreement  effected  by  exchange  of  notes,  signed  at Beijing  on October  30, 1980.
8must be  an "honest broker" between the host country and foreign investors in tenns  of
business.
Third, laws and regulations  of a host country  are respected. MIGA may not issue
any insurance contracts that are inconsistent with the related laws and regulations of host
countries. For example,  regarding the  risk of expropriation  and similar measures, non-
discriminatory measures of general application that governments normally take for the
purpose of regulating  economic  activity are not covered  by MIGA;'0 MIGA will not cover
losses resulting from host government action or  omission to  which the holder of the
guarantee has agreed  or for which he has been responsible before the conclusion of the
contract  of guarantee."
Fourth, the rights and obligations of both MIGA and China regarding MIGA's
portfolio  in China  were clarified  in the agreement  between the two which covered:  i) the use
of local currency , ii) legal protection, and  iii) guidelines on project approval of MIGA
guarantee.  This agreement entered into effect between China and MIGA after China  joined
M[GA.
However, we should admit that MIGA, as an international organization,  cannot
serve the interests of one member or category  of members at the expense  of other members.
0 Article 11 (a) ii, MIGA Convention.
Article 11 (c) ii, MIGA Convention.
9Recalling the history of the creation of MIGA, it is obvious that the Convention was the
result of  a compromise on investment  guarantee issues between developed countries and
developing  countries.  Therefore, the Convention  could not favor  only one side. Thus, from
the perspective  of developing  countries, some provisions in the Convention  may be deemed
to be  unfavorable. Take, for instance, the issue of local remedies.  The Convention  only
stipulates  that  investors  will  "seek  .....  remedies"  instead  of  requiring  them  to
"exhaust  ...  remedies'. 12  The explanation  given for  this provision is that the provision
should not impose an undue burden on investors since they should  not be required to
exhaust all local remedies before obtaining compensation  from the Agency.' 3 Of course,
under general insurance practice it is not necessary for an insured to  exhaust all local
remedies.
3.  Significance  of China's participation  in MIGA
First, participation  in MIGA indicates  that China's open door policy to attract FDI
is a national policy that is internationally  recognized. Chinese authorities  realized that it is
important for the country's economic growth to obtain technology and foreign exchange
through actively  encouraging  FDI into the country. MIGA's mandate  is to promote FDI by
12 "Contracts of guarantee shall require holders of guarantees to seek, before a payment is made by the Agency, such
administrative remedies as may be appropriate  under the circumstances,  provided  that they are readily available to them
under the laws of the host country." See:  Article 17,  MIGA Convention.
13 Para. 28, Commentary  on the Convention.
10providing  political risk guarantees to cover investment  in developing countries. This is in
line with China's current policies.
Second, it demonstrates that Chinese authorities  have full confidence  in handling
the domestic political  situation, as well as China's capacity  to provide foreign investors with
political  risk-free  investment  conditions. This will serve to ease the investors' concerns  with
regard to political risks. It is understandable  that foreign investors worry much about their
investment's security in a country which is in the transition from a planned economy to a
market-oriented  economy.
Third, it reflects China's practical diplomacy and willingness to safeguard the
interests of developing countries in intemational organizations. According to the MIGA
Convention,  the voting  power in the Agency reflects the view that developed and developing
countries have an equal stake in foreign investment and therefore shall have equal voting
power.'4 It is impossible for MIGA's Board to pass any important decision that is not in
favor of developing countries, since all important decisions  of the Board would have to be
taken by a special majority  of at least two-thirds of the total voting power, representing at
least 55 percent of total subscriptions.'5  In fact, developing country's voting power has
already reached 50% as originally designed.' 6 From China's perspective, this is  good
progress, compared with the existing  voting system of the Bank and IMF where votes are
4 Para.  63, Commentary  on  the Convention,  1985.
15 Para.  63, Commentary  on  the Convention,  1985.
Developing  countries'  voting  power was 31%,  47.8%  and 50.60  % respectively  in 1991,  1994  and  November,  1996.
11distributed according to dollar subscriptions.' 7 MIGA's voting structure  challenged the
dollar-voting system, and  developing countries'  interests could be  safeguarded better
through such a voting system. In addition,  in line with the MIGA Convention,  by joining
MIGA, China could  have one of the 22 seats in the MfGA Board,'8 with a representative  of
its own on the Board of  Directors. China's voting power will be 3.6%, and it is thus the
sixth biggest shareholder among  MIGA  members. This would  no doubt provide China
with another important  forum in World Bank group, by which China could play a crucial
role in safeguarding  its own interests and those of other developing  countries.
Fourth, it  illustrated that China's legal system relating to foreign investment is
linked with international  practice by recognizing MIGA's  Convention as an international
commitment. MIGA  played a  catalytic role in  accelerating China's  recognition of  an
international  investment  insurance  regime. This is not only because  MIGA's Convention  is
a  multilateral treaty which  has been discussed for a long time between developed and
developing countries,  but also because MIGA' s Convention  is  in conformity  with China's
bilateral  investment  protection  agreements.
At the World  Bank,  the voting  power  distribution  was: Part  I countries  (developed  ) 62.99%,  and  Part  II countries
(developing)  32.4  1%  as of  November,  1996.  At the  IMA,  the voting  power  distribution  was: developed  countries  61.2%
and developing  countries  38.8% as of November,  1996.
By  the end 1996 the seats  on  MIGA Board  increased  to 24.
12III  MIGA'S PORTFOLIO  INCHINA
China signed the MfGA convention  on April 28, 1988 and it fulfilled the other
formalities a few days later,  thus becomning  a contracting  party to  MIGA. In November
1991, MIGA and China signed three agreements, which laid down a good foundation  for
MIGA's portfolio  in China'9
However, the first contract for investment was not issued until 1993. MIGA's
slow beginnings  in China might have been due to the following:  i) as a new agency, it took
time to win name recognition;  ii) there was an inhibiting effect on private capital flows to
China after the political events of  1989;20 iii) most investing enterprises are small or
medium size, their investment were short-tenn-oriented  and  on a trial basis; and iv) some
investors desired to avoid the "screening" system where MIGA's guarantee application  are
processed by both MIGA and China,  and in China,  by both local and central  authorities.
As  of January 1997, MIGA has  concluded 18 contracts of guarantee in  11
projects in China, totaling over $63.44 million.  It has about 100  active registrations for
prospective guarantees of projects in the country. These projects are in the sectors of
agribusiness,  construction,  oil and gas, manufacture  and infrastructure  ( see details in Table
1 and Figure 1 -4).
9 These three agreements  are: i) Agreement on Legal Protection  for Guaranteed  Foreign Investtnents;  ii) Agreement on Use
of Local Currency ; iii) Guidelines on Approval of WGA  Guarantees, signed by MIGA and China Ministry of Finance
inNovember  1991.
20 Lorn  S. Weisenfield,  "MIGA's Cooperation  with China and its Potential Role", 1995.
13Table  1
MIGA's PORTFOLIO IN CHINA
(AS OF JANUARY 31  1997)
. . . ..  ...  ..  ...
'92  SUZHOU LEDERLE  Construction and  Suzhou,  (2)  $ 7,000,000  15 yr.  American Home Products  United States
PHARMACEUTICAL  operation of a  Jiangsu
CO.  LTD.  pharmaceutical plant  _
'92  CONTI  Construction and  Wuhan Hubei  (2)  (3)  $  766,000  15 yr.  Continental Enterprises Ltd.  United States
AGRICULTURAL  operation of a NV
DEVELOPMENT  CO.  producing chicken eggs
L__  _LTD.
'92  WUHAN CONTI  Construction and  Wuhan Hubei  (2)  (3)  $ 3,793,000  15 yr.  Continental Enterprises Ltd.  United States
POULTRY  BREEDING  operation  of 100%
____  FARM  LTD.  owned hatchery
'93  YIXING ST. LOUIS  Est.  & oper. of a JV  Yixing City,  (2)  $  540,000  10 yr.  China Capital Devel. Corp.  United States
COPPER  CO. LTD.  copper.-products  Jiangsu
_  ______________________  manufacturing  co.
'93  SINOPEC-  Sell, install, support,  Tianjin City  (2)  (3)  S  990,000  15 yr.  Honeywell Inc.  United States
HONEYWELL  process mgt. +  control
(TIANJIN) LTD.  systems_____
'94  SHANGHAI SUNNEN  Assembly and  Pudong,  (2)  (3)  $ 2,700,000  15 yr.  Sunnen Products Co.  United States
PRODUCTS  CO.  LTD.  marketing machine  Shanghai
tools and related
product
'94  SIKA SILK  Production of high  Chengdu,  (1)  (2)  (3)  $  412,000  15 yr.  Pepsi-Cola  nternational  Uniited  States
CORPORATION  LTD.  quality silk  Sichuan  (1)  (2)  (3)  $  601,000  15 yr.  Ratti Technologies  S.r.L.  Italy
(1)  (2)  (3)  $  601,000  15 yr.  Shinwha Textile Co. Ltd.  Korea
'94  SHENZHEN  Acquisition and  Shenzhen  (2)  (3)  $ 6,900,000  15 yr.  Catalina Lighting Inc.  United States
JIADIANBAO  expansion of SlEP
ELECTRIC  PRODUCTS
CO.  LTD.
'95  CPM SHENGCHANG  Joint venture to  Liyang City,  (1)  (2)  (3)  $ 5,850,000  IS yr.  Ingersoll-Rand China Ltd.  United States
LWYAING  MACHINERY  manufacture, marker  Jiangsu
CO.  LTD.  animal food
'95  HAINAN MEINAN  Construction and  Halkou,  (1)  (2)  (3)  $16,700,000  15 yr.  Atlantic Comnmercial  Finance  Netherlands
to  POWER  CO.  operation of Hainan  Hainan  (1)  (2)  (3)  $ 4,000,000  7 yr.  ING Bank  Netherlands
'96  Meinan power plant
'96  NANCHANG ANXIN  Produce feed grains  Nanchang,  (1)  (2)  (3)  $12,587,000  15 yr.  Andre & Cie S.A.  Switzerland
OIL  FACTS AND  and oil by-products  Jiangxi
FEEDSTUFF  (GROUP)
CO. LTD.  . . _--  __-  __._-_-___
* COVERAGE (1) =  CURRENCY  TRANSFER, (2)  =  EXPROPRIATION,  (3) =  WAR & CIVIL DISTURBANCE.
SOURCE: COMPLIED  FROM  "MIGA ANNUAL  REPORT", VARIOUS  YEARS.Figure  1
MIGA's  China Portofolio by Type of Coverage
(as of January  31, 1997)
Currency  transfer  $40.751 million
Expropriation  ,*  $61.578 million
War & civil disturbance  $55.818 million
Breach  of contract  _
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70Figure 2
Distribution  of MIGA'  China Portfolio  by Sector





Distribution  of MIGA's  China Portfolio  by Geography
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1%  1%Is there any possibility  of loss by MIGA  in China ? Hlow  can potential claims be
prevented ?  The following  section discusses MIGA's coverage.
1. Currency transfer risks
Currency  transfer risks, for a number of other reasons,  normally occur  because of a
host country's international  balance of payments difficulties.  The host country could apply
controls  on foreign exchange, prohibiting  or restricting foreign investors who seek to remit
their legal profits or income out of the host country.  According  to international  law, the right
to impose foreign exchange  controls  is based on  a country's sovereignty.  So long as a host
country's foreign exchange controls  neither breach its obligations  in related treaties or
agreements nor injure other  countries' monetary policy, no  other nation may object.
However, foreign investors could also suffer from the restrictions of foreign exchange
controls  introduced  by a host country. That is why investors  often  put possible introduction
of foreign currency  transfer  restrictions  on the list of political  risks.
M1GA  may provide  political  risk coverage guarantee  against restrictions  on foreign
exchange control, in terms of  "an active restriction", which is, " a decision by the host
government denying conversion and /or  transfer of  local currency or authorizing such
conversion and transfer at an exchange rate less favorable than the lowest exchange rate
determined  under  the contract of guarantee  ...";  and in terms  of  "a passive  restriction",
which is,  " a failure by the host country's exchange authority to act on conversion  and/ortransfer within ninety days from the  date on  which the guarantee holder applies for
conversion  and/or transfer...  ,21
In China,  foreign investors may transfer all or part of their foreign exchange
outside China whenever  they have reserves in their foreign exchange deposit accounts. It is
hard to imagine  that China would actively  prohibit  the remittance  of currency  abroad.
First,  it is  against the legislation in  China to  prohibit remittances.  Foreign
investors' lawfully earned income and profits are fully protected by law. For example, the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprises Using Foreign Investment clearly
provides  that: " Legitimate profits obtained from enterprises using foreign investment by
foreign investors, other legitimate eaniungs  and funds after clearing of accounts may be
remitted aboard."
Second, recalling  the 15 years reform, it is obvious that China's foreign exchange
system achieved  a great success: unification  of foreign exchange rates were created instead
of multiple currency  practices. Separate exchange  markets have been unified, and the scope
of discriminatory  policies have been substantially  reduced. This demonstrates that China's
foreign exchange system has  relaxed  restrictions gradually and is on  track for greater
liberation.22
21 Article 1.24,  MIGA, Operational  Regulation.
22 For a detailed discussion of China's foreign exchange system reform, c.f. David Wall, Jing Boke and Yin Xiangshuo:
"China's Opening Door", The  Royal Institute of lnternational  Affairs, 1996.
15Thirdly,  foreign exchange  reform, is a key component  in the framnework  of China's
economic reform, and it is tightly linked with other sectors such as import, export, and
foreign investnent. If some restrictions are introduced,  other sectors would be affected, and
some unintended  consequences  could follow.
Fourth, China's  acceptance of  Article VII  of  LM\F  provided an  additional
safeguard for foreign investors. For instance, China will not increase restrictions on the
transfer of profits. Because while accepting  the obligations  of Article VIII, China undertakes
to refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current
intemational transactions or from engaging in a discriminatory currency arrangement or
multiple currency  practices without  IMF approval. 23
However, there may be  risks of  "passive restrictions". Therefore, one point
should be noted while examining  MIGA's portfolio in China. Chinese regulations stipulate
that Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIEs) must  apply to  the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange Control (SAFEC) or its branch offices for  transfer by debiting the
foreign exchange deposit account of  the FlIEs concerned. Thereafter,  SAFEC or  its
branches are supposed  to respond in time to the FIEs' applications  whether in favor or not,
and any delay exceeding  90 days would be deemed as a currency  transfer blockage, should
any losses be incurred due to such delay.
23 China accepted  the obligations  of Article VIII of IMF Agreement  on December  1  ,1996. See: IMF News Brief, November
27,  1996.
162. Risk of expropriation  and  similar  measures
Foreign investment  has been provided ful  protection  by  legislation in China"
Except under special circumstances,  the State shaU not nationalize or expropriate wholly-
owned foreign enterprises. Should it prove necessary to do so in the public interest, legal
procedures shall be  followed and  reasonable compensation will be  made". 24 Only in
extraordinary  circumstances,  the State may cany out a compulsory  purchase or requisition.
For example, " in case of war, threat of war or other state of  emergency, the Chinese
Government shall have the right of compulsory  purchase or requisition with respect to a
portion  or all of the petroleum  earned or purchased by the foreign contractor."  25
Compared with direct expropriation,  foreign investors are much more concerned
about the risk of indirect, or de facto,  expropriation or  similar measures. The MIGA
Convention  has an extensive definition  of "the risk of expropriation  and similar measures",
that is, " any legislative action or administrative  action or omission attributable to the host
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of guarantee of his ownership or
control of, or  a  substantial benefit from, his  investment,."26  In  addition,  "host
government" is defined by the Convention  as  including "any public authority" of the host
24Article  5,  the Law  of the People's  Republic  of China  on Enterprises  Operated  Exclusively  with  Foreign  Capital.  1979.
25 Article  26, Regulations  of the People's  Republic  of China on the Exploitation  of Offshore  Petroleum  Resources  in Co-
operation  with  Foreign  Enterprises,  1982.
26 Article  11  a (ii),  MIGA  Convention.
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country,  or, "for example, a defacto government  over the territory  in which the Investment
Project is located." 2S  However, in order to balance the sovereignty  of the host country and
the need to protect foreign investment,  the Convention  has an exception clause, that is, it
does  not  cover sovereignty acts  that  are  "non-discriminatory measures  of  general
application which govermnents normally take  for the purpose  of regulating economic
activity  in their territories". 29
There are two points that should be noted while examinring  MIGA's portfolio in
China. First,  it is necessary to provide information to the local govermnent in which the
MIGA-covered  project will be located, in order to ensure appropriate  knowledge  on its part.
This is important,  since China is such a large country. Second, two trends should be
avoided regarding the coverage of expropriation  and similar measures, one is to attempt to
construe the exception  clause too widely,  which would favor a host country; the other trend
is to ignore the exception  clause altogether in order to augment the guaranteed coverage,
which would favor foreign  investors.
3. War and civil disturbance  risk
27 Article 3, MIGA Convention.
28 Article 1.35,  MIGA Operational  Regulations.
Article 11 a (ii), MIGA Convention.
18The definition of war and civil disturbance risk in the MIGA Convention  is " any
military  action or civil disturbance in any territory of the host country".30  The possibility  of
outbreak of war or civil disturbance  in China  is quite limited due to: the ending  of Cold War,
the improved relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and domestic stability.
However, MIGA's portfolio in China in terms of issuing guarantee against war and civil
disturbance could  have a twofold significance.
First, China has vast maritime petroleum and gas resources. This is one of the
areas of  China's focus in seeking foreign capital.  For example, China National Off-Shore
Oil Corp. alone utilized US $1.8 billion of foreign  investments in the joint exploration  of its
maritime petroleum resources during 1990-93,  especially in the Spratly Islands area
Many Western  petroleum  companies are involved in this area. This area's great resources
attract not only Western petroleum companies,  but also  the neighboring  countries. China's
position regarding neighboring  countries' claims on the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands
area is that: it will be "laying aside disputations  and carrying on joint exploration".  It is hard
to forecast the possibility of outbreak of war in this sensitive area. Nevertheless, MIGA's
guarantee against war risk could ease investors' worries.
Second, with regard to  civil disturbance, MIGA could provide wide coverage
against such risks which could  take the form of riot or civil commotion.  In China's case, this
30  Article  11,  a (iv)  ,  MIGA  Convention.
31 "1994  China  Foreign  Economic  Statistical  Yearbook",  China  Statistics  Publisher,  1995.
19kind of events would hardly  happen again.  Because having experienced  the 1989 Tiananmen
Event, more and more Chinese  realize that stability  is a high priority  for China.  Civil
disturbance is neither good for the people nor for the country. However, some investors
could worny that similar events could  happen in the future, MlGA's guarantee against such
risk should dispel their worries about simnilar  events.
IV  CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since its inception, M1GA has played a  significant role in helping developing
countries to attract foreign direct investment,  although  the institution  is only eight years old
and has less than 100 people to serve 141 member countries. 32 In fiscal year 1996 (July
1995-June 1996), M1GA issued coverage of approximately  US$900 million, which has
facilitated  investment  in the form of FDI of about US$6.6 billion. 33 The ratio is about 1:7,
that is to say, one dollar of MIGA-insured  investment  helps to mobilize over seven dollars.
MIGA's catalytic  role is well demonstrated.  Also, MIGA plays a role to diffuse private FDI
flow to developing countries, since only 30% of  MIGA's  coverage went to  those  12
countries that receive 80% of FDI flowing to developing countries in 1995; the other 70%
went to other developing countries. 34 How may  MIGA assist developing countries to
attract more FDI in light of the challenges  discussed below ?
32 MIGA's  size  of  bWget  and personnel  employed  are 1%  of  the  World  bank  and 5%  of the  IFC.  See  details  in:
Akira Jida,  Executive  Vice  President  of  MIGA,  "AdIGA:  the Standard-Setter  ofInvestment  Promotion  Business',




1. Financial  Constraints
MIGA was designed to be financially  self-sustaining. As of January, 1997, its
portfolio approached three times its initial capitalization  ( 1 billion SDRs when the Agency
was established in  1988). Because its portfolio has grown rapidly and performed well,
MIGA could soon reach the limits  imposed on it by its initial capitalization.  MIGA is now
starting to face a possible financial  squeeze: by fiscal year 1998, its financial  resources may
be  close to  exhaustion (in terms of an allowable risk-to-asset ratio), unless its member
nations agree on how to increase its capital. 35
2. The Changing  International  Context
In recent years, private capital has surged into developing countries from banks,
mutual funds, multinational corporations  and other private sources. The net total private
flow amount  increased from $44 billion in 1990 to $167.1 billion in 1995.36  Compared
with the $43.8 billion that the World Bank and other governments' official sources lent to
developing  countries  in the same year, private capital took the lion's share of financial  flows
to the developing countries. The World Bank and other official sources no longer account
35or  some contracts are canceled.
36 ,World  Debt  Tables:  External  Finance  for  Developing  Countries",  World  Bank, 1996.
21for a bigger share as was the case. It looks almost paltry  compared with the FDI amount
that developing countries collectively  attracted. In recognition of  this reality, developing
countries try their best to attract FDI.  How may MIGA facilitate developing countries in
attracting  more FDI ?
3. The Changing  Demand of Member Countries  as the Case of China
In 1995 developing  countries attracted $90 billion in FDI  of  which China alone
received 45 percent,  or $  38 billion. 37 China has  a  wide range of opportunities for
investors, manufacturing  (except investments related to national security, traditional crafts,
and poisonous material ), energy, transportation, communication,  and most of the service
sector, while some developing countries still have various restrictions on these areas. It is
hard for China to select high quality FDI at the beginning of attracting FDI.8 However, as
the increasing of inflow FDI and wider opening to the outside, China has more choice in
selecting the upcoming FDI. Although China has a great demand for foreign capital, the
attention  of China on attracting FDI is now based on "quality" rather than on the "quantity"
of investment, that is,  to  move FDI from  a  short-term, quantitative to  a  long-term
qualitative  strategy.
4. Relations with National and Private  Issuers
3"What  deternines  foreign  direct  investment  T"  DEC  Notes,  No. 16,  World  Bank,  August  1996.
38 For example,  China  only  attracted  US$1.76  billion  FDI  in 1979-82.
22MIGA's relations  with other  national  and private  issuers  are both supplementary
and  competitive.  MaGA's  portfolo  in a host  country  will  be supplementary  to and also  be in
competition  with the portfolio  of national  and private  issuers.  Take MlGA's portfolio  in
China  as an example.  From Figure  4,  we can see that the main investors  come from the
United States. However if  OPIC resumes its political risk insurance business in China, 39
MIGA's portfolio  might be affected  negatively.  In addition,  one of the major source
countries  of FDI  in China  is Japan,  but Japanese  investors  always  go to their  national  issuer
M1TI  for coverage  against  political  risks  instead  of MGA.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To discuss  MlGA's role in facilitating  FDI to developing  countries,  two points
should  be bome in mind;  first, MIGA is neither a commercial  nor a national  insurance
institution.  As an international  institution,  it should  be responsive  to its "client"  --- member
countries;  and second,  MIGA's comparative  advantages  are:  i) its international  experience
in both underwriting  and  operating  its portfolio;  ii) its neutral  position  and approach  which
might  be acceptable  to both host countries  and  foreign  investors;  iii) its guarantee  portfolio
will  not  be affected  by bilateral  relations;  and iv)  its mediation  and  legal  advice.
39Post-Tianannen  Square  detminations by the US  Governent have  caused  the suspension  of OPIC  progam in China.
23MIGA plays  a  role of  "catalyst" to  encourage FDI  flow  into developing
countries.40 In China's case , MIGA may play a role of  "screening" the investment in
addition  to its role as a "catalyst" for the following  reasons:
1. The quality of FDI in China  is not always high. It  does not necessarily  bring all
the good things of FDL such as technology and skills transfer. Enterprises with small and
medium-size investments ( less than US $1 million) occupied the major portion  of EDI
national  total. Also, the level of technology  is often low. Most joint enterprises  include local
town-village  enterprises  (TVEs) and overseas Chinese  investors.
2.  Investments in some sectors have already spilled over. Especially in consumer
sectors, in which many foreign investors concentrated involved, for example, fast food,
beverage, beer, detergents,  cosmetics and shampoo.  Detergents represented 32% of national
output in 1995, beverage and beer took 39.70/o  and 20% of total national  output in 1994.41
3.  Local partners provided too many discounts to foreign investors. Some local
officials are anxious to attract foreign investment and technology without considering the
costs. For example,  they underestimate  the value of key assets such as land and machinery.
Another example  is the acceptance  of unfavorable  clauses in contracts, such as guaranteeing
40 MIGA  could insure investments  in either new projects  or in the expansion,  modernization,  privatization, or financial
restructuring  of existing  projects.  MvIIGA could also cover different  forms of inivestment:  equity,  shareholder  loans,
shareholder  loan guaranties,  technical  assistance, and management  contracts.  Sce details in Geral T. West, "Investinent
Insurance",  A LatinFinance,  June 1994  supplement.
41 "China Investment",  April 1996.
24investors' fixed retums of their investment  without requiring them to take any commercial
risk. That is, if the retums do not reach a certain annual percentage, the local partner of the
investor  should pay the difference  through other financial  resources.42
4.  Many investment related to pollution-intensive  industries. In  1991, foreign
investors established 11,515 enterprises, and the contract investment  amount to US $ 8.77
billion. Among them respectively, 36.80% of total investment and 29.12% of enterprises
were pollution-intensive  industries.  43  The ratio is  high mainly due to the fact that  some
foreign investors took advantage of local officials' anxiety to secure foreign capital to get
temporary economic growth by  sacrificing environment protection; and  advantage of
different standards regarding environment  regulations,  implementation  between developed
and developing  countries.
In issuing a guarantee to an investment,  MIGA's  "screening" role is reflected in
the following  respects:44  i) developmental  and environment  impact,  that is, the economic
soundness of the investment  and its contribution  to the development  of the host country; ii)
legal protection, that is, compliance of the investment with the host country's laws and
42 For example, there were  articles  regarding profits sharing in a contract.  One stipulated  that: " Part A  shall ensure that the
annual  capital  profit  rate  of Party  B's  investment,  xX%/o,  i.e. US$  xxx,xx and it shall  be net payment.  The  contractual
cooperative  enterprise shall remit said payment to Party B's designated  bank account by installment at the end of June
and December  of each year after the establishment  of the contractual cooperative  enterprise." In addition, another article
stipulated that, on the expiration  date of the above enterprise,  " Part A shall guarantee  to pay back to Part B investment
principal of  US$ xxx,xxx  plus all accrued profit." If Party A cannot fulfill this obligation, its guarantor should fulfill
this obligation.
43 Su Lin and Zhang Suntan," Issues in China's Utilization of Foreign Direct Investment",  p.  142, 1996.
44 This role is consistent  with the MIGA Convention,  the Operational  regulations,  and other policies adopted  by the Board of
MIGA. See: Article 12,  MGA  Convention.
25regulations;  and iii) consistency  of the investment  with the declared development  objectives
and priorities of the host country. With such a screening, it is difficult for the above-
mentioned  investments  to go through. Therefore, MIGA's screening role is more important
than the role of catalyst  in China's case.
Also, MIGA could  play the role of  "demonstration"  by making ful  advantage  of
its limited capacity. The maximum amount of coverage that NIIGA can issue for a single
project is currently $50 million and for a host country is $225 million. 45 As Table 2
indicates, the amount of FDI flow into China is growing. Take 1995 as an example, China
attracted US $ 38 billion,  while MIGA's exposure in China currently is about  US $ 80
million.  Deducting the existing  portfolio  amounting to US $63.44 million, only US $ 96.36
million is  left. Therefore, MIGA should leverage its  remaining guarantee capacity to
maximize the amount  of "quality" foreign  investrnent  to China.  As there is a Chinese  saying:
good steel  should be  used in  the edge of  a  knife. For  example, MIGA  could play
"demonstration"  role in the following issues. These demonstration  effects would manifest
MIGA's comnmitment  to promoting  FDI into developing  countries.
45"Investment Guarantee  Guide", MIGA, Sept. 1996  and  MIGA Amnual  Report 1996.
26Table 2  Contracted  and  Actual  FDI in  China:  1979  - 1995
($ billion)
79-82  83-87  88-90  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Contracted  6.01  16.858  17.493  12.422  58.736  111.43  82.68  90.288
Actual  1.76  1.442  1.184  4.666  11.291  26.023  34.45  37.736
Source: "China Statistics  Yearbook",  various year.
Streamlining  the legal framework  for FDI
Although China currently  receives almost one third of all FDI among developing
countries, the rules and regulations  governing  FDI still need to be improved. For example,
some rules  lack  transparency,  some lack uniformity  and  some are not completely  in line
with international  practice.46  Foreign investors pay  attention to the rules and regulations
governing FDI, which are mainly in areas of  admission, treatment, currency transfer,
expropriation  of foreign investments and the settlement of disputes between governments
and foreign investors.  As China has a continued demand for FDI, it is necessary to design a
rule-based legal system governing  FDI in order to attract FDI on a continuing  basis. China
recently has  embarked on  a  program to  reform its  legal  system to  complement and
46 Although the issue  of uniformity has  been a  two-edged sword for foreign investors, they tend  to think that both
transparency and  uniformity are crucial for development of a  rule-based system of  commercial law.  See, Person,
Margaret "China's Integration  into the Intemational Trade and Investment  Regime, November 1996".
27implement the market economy which is the goal of  its  economic reform. Laws  and
regulations will be enacted  and revised in a wide range of fields. MIGA could facilitate  the
establishment  of  a sound legal framework  to encourage greater FDI in China by increasing
foreign investor's confidence  in their reliance on laws and regulations  which apply to their
investments.
Policy advice papers
In the course of attracting foreign investment, some unintended consequences
occur and some problems need to be solved. Different suggestions were offered  to the
authorities.  Due to its neutral position,  MIGA's policy recommendations  are more likely to
be considered  or accepted  by the authorities.
MIGA, for example, could provide a policy paper on the issue of "national
treatment". That is because Chinese authorities  meet domestic complaints  about the alleged
"unfair" competition  from foreign companies. But questions about: how to shape uniform
national treatment, of both foreign investors and domestic companies in order to provide
equal competition, which could protect the interests of  domestic companies while not
hanning foreign investors ? In other words, how could China still attract FDI while not
harming domestic companies ?  MIGA could analyze what kinds  of national treatment,
according  to international  practice, could  be granted  to foreign  investors.
28Also, M[GA  could provide a  policy paper analyzing the environment for  investment in
infrastructure  in  China. Some  foreign investors do want to invest in this area with large sums of
money, but request extensive concessions, considering the risks they will face in the long run.47
MIGA could make detailed suggestions with comparative analysis and assessment regarding the
justification of  these "concessions" compared with other countries' experiences including other
transition economy  countries.  Feedback from private investors  to Chinese authorities  would be useful
in this respect. This kind of policy papers would definitely  provide  good reference to the policy
makers in the central  and local government.
Priority sector
Figure  2  indicates that the  major portion (94%) of  MIGA's  distribution of
portfolio  by sector in China has gone into manufacturing.  Comparatively,  from Table 3 we
can see that the major portion of FDI has also gone into the industrial and real estate sector,
accounting  for nearly 83.1% of the national  total. However, less FDI went into other needy
sectors of economy such as agriculture, transport and communications (about 3.3 % of
national  total).
It should  be noted that these sectors are not only the backbone of any economy,  but
also play a key role in attracting  more foreign  investment.  In addition, in terms of industrial
47 For example,  they  want  the central  government  to stand  behind  loans  made  to cnterprises  carried  out at the national  level,
provincial  governments,  and state  owned  enterprises  to be guaranteed  by the central  govemment.  see: Larry  L. Simms
"The  stake  of the inland  region  in the development  of China's  legal  system"  paper delivered  at the Fourth  Annual  US-
China Inland Economic  Development  Seminar,  Chengdu,  China, Oct.13-16,1996.
29sector, more foreign investment has gone into labor intensive projects such as garments,
textiles, and  electronics. China could not  benefit from the advanced technology and
equipment  which is supposed to come along with inflow FDI. T'he  Chinese authorities  have
realized that they should divert the attention  of foreign investors by guidelines of industrial
policy, and  also should encourage investment in high-tech industries, rather than labor-
intensive ones. On March 25, 1994, The China State Council issued a document entitled:  "
The Framework of National Industrial Policy for 1990s", which pointed out three kinds of
industries  as  priority  industries: infrastructure and  basic  industries;  leading  (pillar)
industries; and new & high-technology  industry. 48 This could also be a good reference for
MIGA while  issuing guarantees in China.
Table 3  Foreign Direct Investment  in China (contracted) by Sector (1979-1995)
Sector  Percentage  of national  total (%)
Agriculture  1.5
Communication  and Transportation  1.8
Construction  2.6
Commerce,  Ford Service,  Material Supply  and Marketing  3.8
Real Estate, Public Utilities  28.1
Industry (garments, textiles,  electronics,  and plastics, etc.)  55.0
Other  7.2
Source: computed  from China State Planning  Commission  (SIC).
48 China  State  Planning  Commission,  1994.
30Priogtv regions
The major portion of MIGA's portfolio  by geography in China is concentrated  in
the coastal area amounting  for about 75%, while investment in the inland area (central and
western China) amounted for only to 25% (see Figure 3).  As we know, the economic  gap
between coastal area and inland area is growing. This wide gap could be harnful to the
economic development in the country. It also could lead to polarization of the developed
coast versus the developing inland area. This generates a negative impact not  only on
China's economy  as a whole, but also on the social stability  of the country. The inland area
is  the priority of the national development plan. China's  current Ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000)  emphasizes  the  need to  foster the  development of  the  comparatively
backward interior provinces and  to  attract  foreign investment to  such  areas.  Also,
infrastructure  investment  and financial assistance  to the area was committed by the central
government.
As early as  June of 1993, MIGA and Ministry of Finance of China sponsored a
seminar "Foreign Direct Investment Promotion to the Westem Provinces of China" in
Chongqing City located in western China.  This seminar could be considered  as a signal of
MIGA's efforts to encourage investments  into inland area. Two projects in the inland areas
have been issued guarantee  by MIGA since then. This shift was appreciated and should be
encouraged  to grow.
31Reform of SOEs
State-owned  Enterprises (SOEs) still occupy a central role in national economy.
The slow pace of structural reform in this sector has curtailed economic  development.  One
of the priority tasks for the Chinese government is to increase the market orientation of
SOEs by deepening structural reforms, to enable SOEs to adapt to market forces. Foreign
investments with advanced technology, skill and capital inpul, are encouraged to invest in
SOEs by the government. MIGA  could support transformation of SOEs by providing
insurance to investors involving in  SOEs against political risks. To  be  qualified under
MIGA's  criteria of  "new  investment", 49 the  foreign investment should be  used  to
modernize, expand, or enhance the fiiiancial  viability of  existing SOEs. In addition, the
selected SOEs should operate on a commercial  basis although they are owned by the State,
in order to be qualified as eligible investment.  MIGA's involvement  will relieve investor's
worries and take the lead to encourage more  FDI into SOEs.
Promote South-South  Investment
According to  official registration, China's  investmeit  overseas reached  $5.5
billion by July of 1996.50 In addition to Hong Kong and Macao, investments by Chinese
nationals have been made in countries  around the world, such as US, Canada, Australia,
Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Chile and Eastem European countries. A large portion of
China's overseas investment was in developed countries. But in recent years,  investment
49 Articles 1.12,  MGA  Operational  Regulations.
50 "China  Financial  News",  July 24, 1996.  This  includes  the investment  in Hong Kong  and Macao,  which  is considered  as
overseas  investment  in  China's  statistics.
32into developing countries has  increased. Almost  all these  investors are  state-owned
enterprises but  operating on  a  commercial basis,  and  therefore qualified as  eligible
investors. 5'  However, there is no  national or private agency in China that could provide
insurance against political risks. The People's Insurance (Property) Company of China  Ltd.
does have a "political insurance policy", but it is mainly for foreign investors in China.
Therefore, MIGA  could be the best choice for China's investment  in other developing
countries, especially the investment in  countries that  do not have bilateral investment
protection  agreements  with China.  Two facts could be impediments  to this possibility:  one is
that China's  investors might  lack  knowledge about MIGA. In  this regard, MIGA's
promotion activity should be strengthened. The other fact is that China's major investment
outflow is into developed countries,  in which MIGA cannot operate, however  this  might
change into developing  countries  as China's economy  develops.
Training  negotiators  regardina BITs with major  FDI source countries
China has signed about 71 Bilateral Investment  Treaties (BITs) with other countries. 52
Recent developments of WTO and OECD might have some effect on the content and
standards of current BlTs. WTO is seeking the establishment  of a multilateral investment
regime, and the report was discussed in the ministerial meeting  held in  Singapore in
December, 1996.53  In the meanwhile OECD is working on the Multilateral  Agreement on
51 "Where  the majority of the equity  in the investor is publicly owned,  the Underwriting  Authority must determine  whether
the Applicant operates on a commercial  basis", Article 1.19,  MIGA Operational  Regulations, 1993.
52 According  to the statistics of ICSID (International  Center  for Settlement  of Investment Disputes), as of November, 1996,
71 countries  have signed BITs with China.
53 See details, Financial  Times,  p.4, and p.  13, October 17, 1996.
33Investment (MAI), which would provide a broad multilateral framework for intemational
investment  regimes and investment  protection  with effective dispute settlement procedures.
MIGA could provide its  expertise to  train Chinese BlTs  negotiators on the following
elements  incorporated  in BIT, such as: i) most-favored-nation  treatment for foreign investors
for entry and operational conditions;  ii) prohibition of TRIMs, such as export performance
requirements, local content; iii) binding international arbitration for investor and  State
disputes; and iv) intemational  law standards for expropriation.
V  CONCLUSION
This study illustrates  that China's evolving  relationship  with MIGA is a good one,
which lays a solid foundation  for further development.  The process of China's participation
in MIGA argues for good interactions  between an international  institution  (MIGA) and one
of its  member states (China). On one hand,  China's  participation illustrates  China's
recognition  and support of MIGA. At the initiating  phase of establishing  MIGA, while the
controversy  between developed  and developing  countries still existed, as a large developing
country, China's participation  no doubt enhanced support for MIGA. On the other hand,
MIGA provided  support in influencing the internal mechanism of  China's reform,  and
further played  a supporting role for shaping policies in domestic discussions on foreign
investrnent  at a time when views were controversial  in this regard.
34China's  case demonstrates that MIGA played an  active role in  integrating a
developing  country  into the multilateral  investment system. Its role could be classified in a
threefold: through project portfolio, policy advice and high level contact between MIGA
management and the Chinese government. This kind of role cannot  be matched  by any
national or private insurance  institution.  In addition, with regard to a long term political risk
investment insurance,  no national or private insurance institutions could compete with
MIGA. Therefore,  MIGA's unique function and comparative advantage  in facilitating FDI
into developing countries  should be further developed.
Private sector investors pay more attention  to the countries where they intend to
invest. They look for good practice in economic  reform and try to avoid places which have
impediments to foreign investment. In  this regard, MIGA, with  its  advantages as  an
mternational  institution,  with more than one hundred developing member countries, could
help to facilitate private capital flows to developing countries. To take full advantage of
MIGA, in order to maximize the developmental  effects with limited financial resources,
MIGA's role of screening and demonstration  should be strengthened in addition to the role
of catalyst. For  those member countries that  already have attracted FDL the role of
"screening" and "demonstration"  should be strengthened; and for those member countries
that are not able to attract  FDI, the role of "catalyst" should  be strengthened.
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